Backup encryption
Backup encryption is the use of a cipher, most often AES-256, to make backup data unreadable without a key, both in transit across the network and at rest on backup storage. It protects a stolen or lost copy from being read, but it does not stop anyone from deleting a backup.
Where is backup data encrypted?
Backup data is exposed at two stages, and encryption covers each separately. In transit, a protocol such as TLS encrypts the stream between the protected server, the backup server and the storage, so data cannot be read on the network. At rest, data is encrypted where it is stored, which protects against stolen, lost or returned drives and against anyone who copies the files. At-rest encryption can be applied by the backup software at the source, before data leaves the server, or by the storage as data is written. Source encryption protects the copy wherever it lands, while storage encryption covers only what that system holds.
AES-256, a symmetric cipher with a 256-bit key, is the common standard for both stages. The cipher is rarely the weak point. Key handling is.
How are backup encryption keys managed?
Keys are usually held in an external key management service (KMS) or a hardware security module, not on the backup server. Backup software and storage request keys from the key manager over a standard protocol such as KMIP, so one service can hold keys for several systems. With customer-managed keys, the data owner, not the storage provider, controls creation, rotation and revocation.
Where the key lives decides whether encryption survives an incident. A key kept only on the backup server is lost to ransomware that takes the server, and every backup becomes unreadable to its owner. A key manager running on infrastructure hit by the same attack has to be recovered before any restore can begin. A key manager kept apart from the backups, with a tested recovery path, avoids both outcomes.
What does backup encryption not do?
Encryption controls reading, not deleting. Someone with the right login can delete an encrypted backup as easily as a plain one, and ransomware can encrypt it a second time with its own key. Those risks are handled by an immutable backup, which is why most plans use both. Encryption also changes what a theft yields: a backup copied out in a case of data exfiltration is unreadable if the attacker does not hold the keys.
How does encryption affect deduplication?
Deduplication and compression work by finding repeated patterns, and encrypted data has none, so data encrypted before it is reduced barely shrinks. Backup software therefore deduplicates and compresses first and encrypts afterward. Capacity estimates that ignore this order overstate the savings.
Frequently asked questions
Does backup encryption protect against ransomware?
It protects stolen copies from being read. It does not stop deletion or a second round of encryption by ransomware, which is the job of an immutable backup.
Where are encryption keys kept?
Usually in an external key manager or a hardware security module, away from the backup server, so that losing the backup server does not take the keys with it.
Is encryption in transit enough?
No. It protects data only while it moves across the network. Copies on storage need encryption at rest or at the source.
